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A NEW TORT LIABILITY FOR LACK OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN LEGAL MATTERS
Cornelius J. Peck*
How could one better honor a great teacher and scholar of tort law
than by offering for view the bud of a new tort? Particularly would it
be so if the incentive to be created to avoid that new tort liability will
produce an improvement in the legal profession and the service that pro-
fession gives to society. It is with the hope that this discussion of a predict-
able development will serve as such an offering that I offer tribute to
Wex Malone, whose scholarly works have much improved my understand-
ing of torts from the time I first taught the subject to the present day.
It may be that he and others will realize that the roots of the plant, if
not the bud itself, were taken from beds carefully cultivated by others,
but, knowing his gentle ways, I trust that he, and perhaps others, will
be forgiving.
The new tort I suggest is that lawyers will be held liable in their deal-
ings with clients for failure to obtain informed consent to pursuit of a
course of action, in a manner similar to that in which members of the
medical profession have been subjected to liability for failure to obtain
patients' consent to use of medical procedures and treatment, or the
foregoing of such procedures and treatment. If so, the liability of lawyers
will not be determined only by the standards of the legal profession, but
will also turn upon what members of the consuming public expect in the
way of legal services. The result will be a substantial increase in lawyer
exposure to liability for legal malpractice.
There already has been an increase in the frequency with which lawyers
have been sued for malpractice. Reported decisions on legal malpractice
between 1970 and 1980 quadrupled over those reported in the prior decade,
reaching a number almost equal to all of the previously reported cases
involving legal malpractice.' A survey of attorneys conducted by the
Southern Conference of Bar Presidents produced information that the
number of malpractice cases reported by an attorney or his insurer in-
creased every year between 1972 and 1977, with five times more claims
reported for the last year than for the first.' One major insurer against
legal malpractice liability reported that its losses have doubled in each
year after 1972, with an increase in both the frequency of claims per in-
sured lawyer and the average value of each claim.3
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1. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6, at 18-21 (2d ed. 1981).
2. Stern, Legal Malpractice Dimensions, LEGAL MALPRACTICE REv., Apr. 1981, at 3, 5.
3. McCarthy, Insurance Aspects of Legal Malpractice, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF
TRIAL LAWYERS: TwE MALPRACTICE QUESTION 50, 65 (ABA 1979). The ratio of claims in-
creased from one for every forty-one lawyers to one for every twenty-nine lawyers insured.
The average value of a claim increased from $5,622 to $11,936.
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Most of the malpractice claims currently made against attorneys do
not involve a failure to advise or obtain informed consent." A recent
publication of the American Bar Association reporting the proceedings
of a conference on legal malpractice issues contains no discussion of liabil-
ity for lack of informed consent or failure adequately to advise.' The
second edition of the major treatise on legal malpractice contains only
a three page discussion of the problems associated with the giving of ad-
vice and a discussion of equal length concerning the obligation of an at-
torney with respect to informing a client and making recommendations
concerning settlements. 6 The short discussion concerning advice does state,
citing recent decisions, that liability can exist because of the attorney's
failure to provide advice, and that, while the obligation does not extend
to every possible alternative, it does require discussion of those alternatives
likely to result in adverse consequences. 7 However, the implication of the
passage is that the attorney who is sure of his advice need not discuss
alternatives and their consequences.' Likewise, there is no discussion of
liability for lack of informed consent in recent law review articles on legal
malpractice.'
The recently adopted Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules)" do give considerably greater emphasis to a lawyer's responsibilities
as an advisor than did the earlier promulgated disciplinary rules of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). They thereby
promote the concept that lawyers have an obligation to obtain the in-
formed consent of their clients to courses of conduct which they advise.
4. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, LAWYERS' PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY UPDATE, Feb. 1983, at 78, table 9 [hereinafter cited as LIABILITY UPDATE].
5. See PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE MALPRACTICE QUESTION (ABA
1979).
6. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 434, at 492-94, § 580, at 726-29. The
doctrine of informed consent is mentioned in a discussion of the occasions upon which
a client's judgment is to control a decision, such as whether a potential defect affects
marketability of title, but general application of the doctrine to the legal profession is re-
jected. Id. § 214, at 306-09.
7. Id. § 434, at 493.
8. Id.
9. See Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 281 (1973); Haughey, Lawyers
Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888 (1973); Mallen, Recognizing
and Defining Legal Malpractice, 30 S.C.L. REV. 203 (1979); Wolfram, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV.
281 (1979); Comment, New Developments in Legal Malpractice, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 408
(1977) [hereinafter cited as New Developments]; Comment, Attorney Malpractice: Problems
Associated with Failure-to-Appeal Cases, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 583 (1982); Note, The Stand-
ard of Proof of Causation In Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 666 (1978).
For a discussion of informed consent suggesting its applicability in legal matters by analogy
to the medical profession, see Bridgman, Legal Malpractice-A Consideration of the Elements
of a Strong Plaintiff's Case, 30 S.C.L. REV. 213, 230-31 (1979) (finding no cases applying
informed consent to the attorney-client relationship).
10. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), reprinted in 69 A.B.A. J. 1671
(1983) (the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are separately paginated 1-32).
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Thus, the preamble to the Model Rules states: "As advisor, a lawyer pro-
vides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights
and obligations and explains their practical implications."" Rule 1.4(b)
provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation." The comment to rule 1.4 states that the "client should
have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concern-
ing the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are
to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so." Rule
2.1 provides: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise indepen-
dent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering ad-
vice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such
as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to
the client's situation."'2 The comment to Rule 2.1 explains: "Advice
couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people,
are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes
be inadequate." The obligation to discuss more than legal considerations
is reinforced by the statement in the comment to Rule 2.1 that when a
request for advice of a purely technical nature "is made by a client inex-
perienced in legal matters, . . . the lawyer's responsibility as advisor may
include indicating that more may be involved than strictly legal considera-
tions." As stated in the comment, there is no direct counterpart to Rule
2.1 in the disciplinary rules of the Model Code. Ethical consideration 7-8
of the Model Code does provide that the advice of a lawyer need not
be confined to purely legal considerations, and that the advice should con-
cern the possible effect of each legal alternative.
The preamble to the recently adopted Model Rules attempts to forestall
the imposition of malpractice liability because of a failure to comply with
a rule. It provides:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action
nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been
breached. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers
and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability.
The attempt will almost certainly fail in light of the generally accepted
proposition that members of a profession are under an obligation to those
served to exercise at least the normal skills, ability, and competence of
that profession. 3
11. Id. preamble 2.
12. Emphasis added.
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcorD) OF TORTS, § 299A (1965); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161-62 (4th ed. 1971).
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A valuable and recently published article contains the prediction, here
endorsed, that requiring informed consent will have a growing and
beneficial significance on the practice of law.'" Although, as stated above,
recent suits for legal malpractice seldom are based upon a claimed inade-
quacy of advice or lack of informed consent, there are indications that
such suits may increase in frequency. Statistics concerning legal malprac-
tice reveal that in 1982, while slightly less than ten percent of legal malprac-
tice claims were based on a failure to inform, errors of that type gave
rise to the highest percentage of claims of all categories.' 5 The recent
development of law school courses in interviewing and counseling
encouraged by the American Bar Association,'" and the development of
moot competitions between law school teams on problems of interview-
ing and counseling" will fix those skills as part of the expected and re-
quired competence for practice in the profession. The law school courses
and the moot competitions give emphasis to an attorney's responsibility
for obtaining an understanding of the total problem of a client, not merely
the legal aspects of that problem, and giving, or arranging for, appropriate
advice. '8
14. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307
(1980). This article is highly recommended. It contains an historical account of the principle
of informed consent in legal malpractice, a discussion of the philosophical basis for requir-
ing informed consent, and an assessment of the beneficial effects which will result from
imposition of the requirement. It is hoped that this article may supplement it by a different
and perhaps more detailed consideration of how application of the standards of informed
consent developed for the medical profession will affect the practice of law.
15. See Liability Update, supra note 4, at 78, table 9.
16. In 1982 about 60076 of ABA-approved law schools offered training in interviewing
or counseling. Stillman, Silverman, Burpeau & Sabers, Use of Client Instructors to Teach
Interviewing Skills to Law Students, 32 J. LEOAL EDUC. 395 (1982). The Council of the
ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar proposed at its August 1980
meeting that standard 302(a) of the Standards for Approval of Law Schools be amended
to require training in specific legal skills including counseling. See Winter, Lawscope: Legal
Education-Law Profs Hit ABA Skills Proposal, 67 A.B.A. J. 142 (1981).
17. The client counseling competition was conceived and developed by Professor Louis
M. Brown of the University of Southern California Law Center. It was originally called
the Mock Law Office Competition. It began on an interscholastic level in 1969, and com-
petitions have been held every year since then. Information concerning the competition may
be obtained from the ABA Law Student Division, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois,
60637.
18. See, e.g., ABA LAW STUDENT DIVqSlON, 1982 CLIENT COUNSELING COMPETITION:
RULES, STANDARDS FOR JUDGroN, & FEE SCHEDULE 10-11. The 1982 Standards for Judging
the Client Counseling Competition include the following:
7. Fact gathering should result in a clear formulation of the client's problem.
Did this occur? Or did the lawyers rush prematurely to legal concepts before they
knew the facts? Were the concepts formulated in terms of consequences to the
client as well as in terms of legal concepts?
9. Part of this [the lawyer-client relationship is a working relationship] is an
impression that the lawyer sees the client as a special person-not like everyone
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The American propensity for litigation has been the subject of fre-
quent comment.' 9 In the United States, relationships which might be ex-
pected to be governed solely by mutual respect, trust, and confidence have
been subjected to regulation by law. For example, American society has
rejected an in loco parentis relationship for regulation of many aspects
of the relationship between students and educational institutions2" and has
abandoned a considerable portion of the immunity to tort suits formerly
recognized as applicable to tort claims between spouses2' and parents and
children.22 The relationship of attorney and client could not be more
sacrosanct. Indeed, the tremendous increase in the ratio of lawyers to total
population and the expansion of areas of activity in which legal advice
is required almost guarantee a greater willingness of lawyers to engage
in malpractice litigation against one another. More importantly, the recently
developed standards by which the performance of physicians is judged
has created a tension with standards applied to lawyers which is almost
certain to be intolerable, particularly since the higher standard imposed
upon physicians has been produced by the legal profession and judges
who came from that profession.
Informed Consent and the Medical Profession
The analogy between the medical profession and the legal profession
with respect to the requirement of consent for undertakings and procedures
else. Did the lawyers seek legal solutions appropriate to the client's special per-
sonality and perspective?
11. Lawyers usually offer counsel in non-legal areas-on the "wisdom" of con-
templated action, on financial matters, or even on emotional conflicts. Did the
lawyers work in these non-legal areas with. respect for the client's opinions and
judgment?
14. Did the client understand what the lawyers said about rules of law?
15. 'Did the client feel free to ask questions, challenge suggestions, and offer
his or her own thoughts?
16. The lawyers will probably have proposed solutions for the client's problems.
If these involve immediate behavior ("be realistic," [sic] think clearly," "assert
yourself"), were they offered rather than imposed? Did the client seem to feel
free to reject them or at least comment on them? Did the lawyers and client
together talk about the effect of these immediate steps?
17. Did the lawyers identify and deal with moral difficulties-the client's as well
as their own? Did they seek to approach a moral decision with respect for the
client's conscience and an expectation of respect for the lawyers' consciences?
21. Did the client seem to feel informed and reassured?
19. See Peck, Comments on Judicial Creativity, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1, 35 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). See generally A. MORRIS,
TnE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 583-685 (1974).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F (1979).
22. Id. § 895G.
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was weak if not totally lacking, so long as the liability of physicians for
failure to obtain consent rested on a theory of battery. An operation or
procedure for which the patient had not given consent was an unpermit-
ted and hence socially offensive touching even if it did not result in harm.
It was therefore a battery.23 Comparable touching constitutes no part of
the practice of law. The battery theory has a continued vitality for physi-
cians in cases in which operations are performed upon the wrong limb2"
or in which an experimental drug is administered without explanation that
it is experimental.2 5 But new and complex medical procedures, diagnostic
devices and techniques, and drugs and medicines, which both give new
cures and pose new and unexpected hazards, are not matters with which
the ordinary patient is familiar. Indeed, the development has created a
highly specialized medical profession which is itself not familiar with the
benefits and risks to be anticipated in those procedures. This specializa-
tion of the profession establishes the inadequacy of determining whether
a patient has without explanation consented to a particular treatment on
the basis of the common understanding of reasonable, prudent patients.
Moreover, continued use of the battery theory for recovery could upon
some occasions produce an unjustifiable liability.2 '
Concern for human dignity and the right of an individual to control
what is to happen to his or her body led to recognition of a duty of
physicians to obtain informed consent to use of diagnostic devices, medical
devices, medical procedures, or medication. The first cases imposed a duty
measured by the standards or practices of the profession with respect to
disclosure to patients of risks of proposed treatment.27 These decisions
were criticized as an unvarranted abdication to the medical profession
of responsibility and of the individual's right to make a choice.28 The
23. The classic case is Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), in which
the defendant physician, having obtained permission to perform an operation on plaintiff's
right ear, discovered after plaintiff was under anesthesia that her left ear was in a more
serious condition and performed an operation upon it. The physician was held liable for
a battery even though the operation was performed skillfully and was successful.
24. Moos v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D. Minn. 1954), aff'd, 225 F.2d 705
(8th Cir. 1955).
25. Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. I11. 1978). The earlier analogy
of ihe Mink case was Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 (1873), in which an overly
zealous male suitor injected a sickening substance, believed to be an aphrodisiac, into some
figs which he gave to the object of his lust if not affection.
26. See McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959); McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 381, 422-34 (1957).
27. See ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 24, 499 P.2d 1,
9 (1972). For discussion of the earlier standard, see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
783-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
241-45, 502 P.2d 1, 8-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512-15 (1972).
28. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1 n.15, comment, at 60-61
(Supp. 1968).
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District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals led the way with an alter-
nate formula in its decision in Canterbury v. Spence. 29 In that decision
the court of appeals ruled that, while expert medical testimony would be
required to establish the risks associated with procedures beyond the
knowledge of a layman, the issue of whether a risk should have been
disclosed was to be determined by the standard of the reasonable, pru-
dent person in the position of the patient." Thus, what risks must be
disclosed is not governed by the custom of the medical profession, except
in those cases in which expert testimony establishes that such disclosure
would be detrimental to the patient.3 The latest decisions of a majority
of state supreme courts may suggest that the majority rule still is to ac-
cept the custom of the profession for determining what risks must be
disclosed,32 but the power of Canterbury v. Spence appears to be so great
that that rule is not long to be the majority rule.
According to Canterbury and cases following it, a physician also has
the duty of disclosing alternative courses of procedure and the risks
associated with those procedures. 3 The Washington court has added to
the duty by ruling that upon discovery of an abnormality a physician
must disclose its existence, the diagnostic techniques for determining the
significance of the abnormality, and the risks associated with the use of
those techniques. 4 In a similar vein, the California Supreme Court has
held that liability may be imposed for failure to explain the risks of refus-
ing to take a diagnostic test.33
According to Canterbury, the determination of whether there will be
liability for a treatment the risks of which were not adequately disclosed
will turn upon whether a reasonable, prudent patient in the position of
the plaintiff would have agreed to the proposed treatment if the risks
had been disclosed.' The question is not whether the plaintiff patient
would have consented. Liability thus does not turn upon the hazards of
a post-event determination of what would have been the plaintiff's sub-
jective state of mind concerning the treatment pursued if he or she had
been properly informed.
29. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
30. Id. at 787.
31. Id. at 789. Disclosure likewise would not be required for an unconscious person
in an emergency or for a mentally incompetent person. Id. at 788.
32. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 1008, 1012, 1020-33 (1978).
33. 464 F.2d at 787-88; Gelchell v. Manfield, 250 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); ZeBarth
v. Swedish Hosp. Medical Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972).
34. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980); Gates
v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
35. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
See Comment, Informed Refusal: Physician Liability for Failure to Inform of Risks Associated
with Refusing Diagnostic Tests, 19 SAN DIEOO L. REV. 823 (1982).
36. 464 F.2d at 791.
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A major consequence of these developments in the law concerning
informed consent for the medical profession is that liability may be im-
posed for a harmful result even though there was no negligence other
than the failure to make the required disclosure. Cases have not yet made
it certain whether the Canterbury liability is limited to harmful results
within the undisclosed risks, but proximate cause considerations generally
associated with negligence liability strongly suggest that it should be so
limited.37 The battery analogy, however, would permit recovery even
though the harmful result was not an undisclosed risk.
There are, of course, differences between the medical profession and
the legal profession which caution against automatically assuming that
a standard appropriate for judging the performance of one profession
is appropriate for judging the performance of another profession.
However, upon comparison and evaluation of the need for and the pur-
poses which can be served by providing information, the balance appears
to weigh more heavily in favor of requiring disclosure by lawyers than
requiring disclosure by physicians. An argument against requiring disclosure
by lawyers is that law is not an exact science. It abounds with areas of
technical intricacy and is complicated by numerous 'and varying interrela-
tionships with other areas, sometimes referred to as "the seamless web
of the law." Complicated and technical as it is, however, law is probably
no further from the understanding of lay persons than the function of
the nervous system or the various organs and glands of the body and
the reaction of the body to various treatments and drugs. Indeed, law
is probably closer to that common understanding. Medicine is built upon
the advanced study in the sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics,
which are not a part of the ordinary education. Rules of law have been
adopted, however, for the governance of human conduct and relation-
ships, hopefully with a view toward making them understandable by and
acceptable to those who are to be governed. A medical problem has a
simplicity in that practically all persons have the same desire for a sound
body and good health. On the other hand, legal questions frequently pre-
sent what different persons consider to be overriding moral or ethical ques-
tions to which they would give different answers. How to achieve that
state of a sound body and good health is usually the only question
presented to a physician. Legal problems presented to lawyers are fre-
quently inextricably connected with non-legal problems ranging from
economic to life style and values. The solution of legal problems frequently
involves making accurate predictions concerning the expectable reactions
of other persons to a solution proposed. The client will frequently have
a greater understanding of the personalities and value structures of those
persons than the lawyer consulted. The client therefore can contribute more
37. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 646,
649 (1969).
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to producing a sound legal solution to a problem than a patient can con-
tribute to development of a treatment for an injury or illness, which can
frequently be diagnosed by physical examination of the patient alone. The
concern for human dignity and integrity which led to imposition of a
standard of informed consent for the medical profession weighs at least
as heavily when consideration is given to how legal advice may affect
relations with a person's family, friends, and work associates, his finances
and hence physical well-being, or even his freedom.
Application of Medical Standards of Informed Consent to the
Legal Profession
The major treatise on legal malpractice begins its treatment of the
litigation of legal malpractice cases with a discussion of the selection of
the legal theory of the claim, posing the problem as one of choosing be-
tween the theory of negligence or the theory of contract. 8 The negligence
which may give rise to liability is the failure to exercise the ordinary skill
and knowledge of the profession, and not failure to make disclosure that
would provide the basis for the informed consent of the client. 9 Elsewhere,
after referring to a recent decision of a California court of appeals which
rejected an argument that there was a duty to inform a client that a prop-
osition of law was unsettled, the authors argue for protection of judgmen-
tal decisions which give an attorney freedom to err with confidence. 0 The
opinion of the California court states that "as a matter of policy, an
attorney should not be required to compromise or attenuate an otherwise
sound exercise of informed judgment with added advice concerning the
unsettled nature of relevant legal principles.""' In short, while physicians
are obligated to discuss the risks and uncertainties of a procedure to which
38. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 653, at 802.
39. Id. § 654, at 804.
40. Id. § 214, at 308.
41. Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 889, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 261 (1981).
The defendant attorney had advised his client that she had no community property interest
in her husband's military benefits, without informing her that the conclusion was based
on an unsettled proposition of law. By the time of the decision in the malpractice suit
the California Supreme Court had ruled otherwise. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d
592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). Subsequently
the United States Supreme Court ruled that community property interests did not exist in
military pensions, contrary to the California Supreme Court. McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210 (1981). Congress responded to the McCarty decision by enacting the Former Spouse's
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §
1408(c)(1) (1983)), which permits a state court to deal with a military pension in a manner
consistent with state law. See In re Marriage of Sarles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 24, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (Ct. App. 1983), giving retrospective effect to the federal statute. Why a client
should not be informed of such uncertainty was not explained by the California court. Ad-
vice cannot-be considered "candid," as the authors of the treatise desire, if such a known
uncertainty is not revealed. As a practical matter, a wife is probably much better qualified
1984] 1297
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in their sound professional judgment a patient should submit, lawyers have
no such obligation.
Under current standards clients must be informed of settlement of-
fers in dispute resolutions, 2 but mere information that an offer has been
made is not sufficient to permit an informed decision by the client of
whether to accept the settlement proposal. An attorney handling a case
on a fixed contingent fee may have a conflict of interest with the client
if an offer is made prior to his investment of time for legal research and
the development of evidentiary aspects of the case."3 By itself, such a
potential conflict suggests the inadequacy of communication of no more
than a professional judgment that an offer should be accepted. Informa-
tion about the amounts fixed in recent jury verdicts for similar claims,
the possibilities of a defense verdict, the length of delay to be experienced
if trial is required, the emotional stress expectable from delay and trial,
difficulties of collecting larger sums from a less than fully insured defen-
dant, the pressures upon the defendant and defendant's insurer, the
significance and effect upon recoverable damages of the collateral source
rule, the rule that generally no consideration is'given to income taxes in
computation of lost earning capacity, and the whole complex of irra-
tionalities found in the law of damages should be explained if a client
is to be able to make an informed judgment about a settlement offer.""
Recognition that failure to obtain informed consent constitutes legal
malpractice will drastically revise the current responsibilities of attorneys.
A major portion of the reported law suits for legal malpractice appears
to consist of cases which either were litigated or allegedly should have
been litigated by defendant attorneys. ' In those cases there has been "a
to know her husband's tolerance for uncertainty in negotiations than her lawyer and how
that uncertainty could be used to advantage in the negotiation of a property settlement.
42. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 580, at 726; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1979) (requires an attorney promptly to inform a client of a set-
tlement offer).
43. See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 95-116 (1974).
44. A carefully conducted survey of claimants who received compensation from an
automobile liability insurance company revealed that only twenty-eight percent of them ex-
pected immediately after the accident that they would be compensated for pain and suffer-
ing; only thirty-four percent of those who did not originally expect such compensation
ultimately learned that it was recoverable as damages; and of those who originally did not
know about damages for pain and suffering, only thirty-six percent of those claimants who
retained lawyers (as compared with thirty-three percent of those who did not) learned that
such damages could be covered. J. O'CONNELL & R. SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUF-
FERING: WHO WANTS WHAT, WHEN & WHY? 20, 25 (1972).
45. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, §§ 656-675
According to an ABA study in 1982, 9.7%o of the legal malpractice claims involved
a failure to calendar, 7.907o involved a planning error in choice of procedures, 7.5°/0 involved
a failure to file with no deadline, 6.107o involved a failure to know a deadline, 3.4070 involv-
ed a failure to react to a calendar, and 3.2076 involved malicious prosecution. Other categories
of claims involved litigation, such as failure to know or properly apply law (8.3%), inade-
quate investigation (7.4%), or procrastination (4.501o). See LIABILITY UPDATE, supra note
4, at 78, table 9.
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trial within a trial," in which the plaintiff has attempted to establish what
would have occurred as a result of litigation if the defendant lawyer had
exercised the ordinary skill and knowledge of the profession. This is an
appropriate standard if malpractice consists only of a failure to exercise
the ordinary legal skill and knowledge of members of the profession con-
cerning the applicable legal rules, i.e., if expert estimates of the outcome
of litigation govern the determination of whether there was malpractice.
But if a requirement of obtaining informed consent is imposed upon the
legal profession this standard will not be determinative. Thus, under
Canterbury physicians do not escape liability because there was no proof
of negligence in a treatment or procedure if the risks were not disclosed
and their disclosure would have led a reasonable, prudent person in the
position of the patient to reject the treatment or procedure which caused
harm. The fact that the treatment or procedure was medically sound does
not immunize a physician from liability for harmful consequences of the
treatment or procedure. If a requirement of informed consent is applied
to the legal profession, lawyers will be liable for non-negligent errors of
judgment about undisclosed risks or possible gains which, if disclosed,
would have led a reasonable, prudent client to litigate or forego litigation
by rejecting or accepting a settlement offer.
The question of liability is, of course, different from the question
of damages. In medical cases the plaintiff usually is able to establish harm
by proof of the physical condition which resulted from the treatment or
procedure. In cases of legal malpractice in dispute resolution, a plaintiff
will have to prove what his position would have been if he had not con-
sented to the course of action pursued. Upon occasion this may require
proof of what would have resulted if litigation had been pursued to judg-
ment. On other occasions proof that a settlement offer made would have
been accepted by an informed, reasonable, prudent client will establish
that position. On still other occasions the client should be able to establish
what that position would have been if the defendant attorney had pur-
sued settlement opportunities to which a reasonable, prudent client would
have given approval in lieu of accepting the risks of litigation which proved
to be unsuccessful. Proof of what would have occurred if litigation had
been pursued to judgment or that there were real settlement opportunities
will require the expert testimony of attorneys familiar with trial and set-
tlement of such disputes. However, a lawyer will not escape liability with
respect to settlements on the basis that he had made a non-negligent er-
ror of judgment about the outcome of litigation."
Abandonment of an exclusive standard of sound professional judg-
ment about the results of litigation is appropriate when it is considered
that most cases are not litigated to judgment, but are instead settled."
46. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 580, at 724-25.
47. See Bridgman, supra note 9, at 234-36. A Michigan study of automobile accident
costs and payments indicated that trial was begun in only five percent of the cases, with
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If most of the cases handled by lawyers are settled, it would be preferable
to determine what should have resulted if negotiations for settlement had
been conducted in accordance with settlement standards of the profession
rather than what would have happened in the unlikely event the case had
gone to trial.
4
'
Imposition of liability for the worth of the claim rather than a re-
quirement of proof of what would have happened in a trial would be
consistent with a recent decision of the Washington Supreme Court in
a medical malpractice case.' 9 The suit was brought for the wrongful death
of a patient who had less than a fifty percent chance of survival at the
time of a negligent diagnosis and treatment. The court did not bar recovery
because plaintiff could not prove that the patient would have survived
if properly treated. Instead it permitted a recovery based on the reduc-
tion of the patient's possibility of survival, and did so even though that
reduction was less than half of the patient's remaining chance of sur-
vival. The court's decision was supported by a major law review article
urging such a treatment for similar cases..
Imposition of a requirement that lawyers obtain informed consent of
clients to courses of action which they advise will probably have an even
greater effect with respect to what is required of lawyers in activities other
than litigation. Much of the advice which lawyers give is relied upon by
clients who pursue courses of action which may give rise to disputes. The
risks that impending changes in law will give rise to disputes are matters
about which a reasonable, prudent client would want to be advised. For
settlements frequently negotiated in the course of trial before judgment. A. CONARD, J.
MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBIE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS,
184, 241-42 (1967). Studies of automobile accident cases in New York indicated that only
eight percent of the auto accident cases were processed to trial, that most of those cases
were settled during trial, and that less than two percent of the claims made were controlled
by a court adjudication. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLuM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961);
Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUM.
L. REv. 1115, 1124 (1959).
48. Expert testimony concerning settlement value has been accepted in a few cases under
the current standards of liability. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 1, § 666, at 845-47.
A carefully performed study of 60 settled cases in the First Department of the New York
courts used an evaluation panel of three lawyers and two insurance adjusters. Intercorrela-
tions among the panelists as to settlement value ranged from a high of .83 to a low of
.65. In only 10 of the 60 cases was the actual recovery less than one-half of the panel's
mean estimate of value; in two cases the actual recovery was only 20% of the panel's mean.
The data suggests that expert testimony would be reliable in establishing what was such
inadequate representation in settlement as to constitute malpractice. See D. RosrmTHAL, supra
note 43, at 203-05, tables A-4, A-5.
49. Herskovits v. Group Health Co-op., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983).
50. King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-
existing Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); see also Note,
supra note 9, at 679-81.
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example, the latest and fairly recent decision of a state supreme court
may have reaffirmed the employment-at-will doctrine as a part of the law
of that state, but an employer considering termination of an employee,
particularly a highly paid employee, would want to know of the erosion
of the employment-at-will doctrine which is currently occurring." An
employer with a unionized work force considering the possibility of sub-
contracting work, or transferring operations to an unorganized plant,
would expect to be advised not only of the state of the law previously
developed by the National Labor Relations Board but also of the possibility
of different treatment by an NLRB reconstituted by appointments of the
current President52 and the probable judicial reaction on review of that
treatment. A landlord client who sought review of a standard form lease
with disclaimers of liability would probably expect advice going beyond
the apparent current validity of disclaimers" and would expect a warning
about potential liability to tenants for criminal acts of third persons in-
truding on the premises." ' Clients will expect-their lawyers to advise them
about the changes expectable from a creative judiciary or a changed ad-
ministration. From whom else could they obtain advice so important to
the planning of business ventures or their personal lives?
Many clients come to lawyers without knowledge of vhich aspects
of their problem present legal questions and which aspects present non-
legal questions." They expect advice about what they should do to solve
the entire problem, not merely the legal aspects of the problem. If aspects
of their problem do not present legal questions, they will at least expect
to be so advised and to receive advice about where they can obtain the
required assistance for the non-legal aspects. Moreover, many clients are
unfamiliar with legal procedures and the effect that pursuit of those pro-
cedures will have upon their lives. If a lawyer's obligation with respect
to informed consent is to make full disclosure of all costs, risks, and
benefits of a proposed course of action and alternative courses of action
which would be considered relevant by the prudent client, a lawyer will
be required to discuss more than technical legal aspects of a problem.
A provocative example may serve better to illustrate the requirement
of disclosure in obtaining informed consent. Assume a case of the wrongful
death of a child or spouse in which the sound, honest, and "candid"
51. See Peck, supra note 19, at 29-31.
52. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 1982-83
NLRB Oct. (CCH) 15,317 (1982), rev'd, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 1983-84 NLRB Jan. (CCH)
16,029 (1984).
53. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093
(1971).
54. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sampson v.
Saginaw Prof. Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975); Johnson v. Harris, 387 Mich.
569, 198 NW.2d 409 (1972).
55. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 43, at 70-79.
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professional judgment is that the possibility of establishing liability is
around or slightly over sixty percent with substantial damages if liability
is established. Will the lawyer have made the requisite disclosure to ob-
tain informed consent for the filing and pursuit of a wrongful death ac-
tion if nothing more than the expectable financial costs and a technical,
legal appraisal of the case are discussed? Would not a reasonable, pru-
dent, and obviously inexperienced client want to be advised of the expect-
able delay before the trial or settlement, of the time which will be spent
in consultations and the taking of depositions? Would not a reasonable,
prudent client want to be warned that the process will require frequent
reconsideration over that extended period of time of exactly how the child
or spouse died, of how the accident might have been avoided, of how
unnecessary or fortuitous was the death? Would not that client want to
be advised of the tension and frustration which will grow from uncertainty
about whether the investment of emotional energy and time will be suc-
cessful? And, if the result is a defense verdict, may that client not prop-
erly believe that, even if it had been a sound, professional judgment that
there was a sixty percent chance that liability would be established, he
or she was induced to undertake a course of conduct with enormous per-
sonal costs without information permitting an informed consent? In such
a case an attorney's major protection will be the client's reluctance to
again be subjected to the emotional trauma which accompanies litigation.
But some such cases, or similar cases, will be brought by dissatisfied and
affronted clients.
The major treatise on legal malpractice informs us that there are few
decisions and no agreement concerning whether or when damages for men-
tal distress, pain, suffering or injuries to health are recoverable as conse-
quential damages for legal malpractice. 6 Denial of such damages is
understandable and predictable when the theory of liability is negligence
in failing to exercise professional standards of judgment with respect to
the outcome of litigation. Liability for negligent infliction of emotional
distress is a recent development in tort law.' In medical malpractice suits,
liability for emotional distress falls easily within the "suffering" aspects
of the pain and suffering damages which regularly accompany physical
injuries. Emotional distress caused by legal malpractice will not have the
physical injury to which compensating damages may be easily attached.
The analogy to the medical profession's liability suggests, however, that
such damages should be recoverable. Moreover, the recent recognition of
56. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 1, § 310, at 362.
57. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980) (liabilities imposed for emotional distress caused by a negligent diagnosis that
plaintiff's wife had syphilis); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr.
72 (1968); see also Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg
in California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248 (1974).
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damages for outrageous conduct 8 and even negligent misconduct" sug-
gests that liability for legal malpractice based on lack of informed con-
sent will soon include liability for the emotional distress experienced in
the course of conduct for which informed consent was not obtained.
There are other, less provocative examples of lawyer liability to a client
who pursued a recommended course of conduct without informed con-
sent to the risks involved and a comparison of the risks of alternative
courses of conduct. Persons engaged in business transactions are generally
considered as knowledgeable and informed about the transactions which
they wish to have take place. There almost certainly is no empirical data
concerning the matter, but I believe that even knowledgeable persons con-
sult lawyers with considerable frequency about how a transaction should
be accomplished, and receive advice based upon an unstated assumption
of the lawyers that the major concern of the client is to avoid or minimize
taxes. The tax avoidance advice is possibly not the risk avoidance advice
which the client would have preferred to receive. If one of those risks
eventuates and the risk was not disclosed, an informed consent standard
would lead to liability of the lawyer.
Professor Harrop Freeman, in his early and perceptive casebook on
counselling, produced a case history which he entitled "The Frustrated
President,"6 which illustrates another possibility of lawyer liability to a
client for lack of informed consent in a business transaction. The client
was the developer and owner of a profitable small business which he
decided to sell to a larger, acquiring company. His lawyers arranged the
sale of his business, giving major attention to tax consequences. The con-
tract provided that the client would have a position on the board of direc-
tors of the acquiring corporation, but it did not give him a position on
the executive committee of that board. The client subsequently found his
personal life frustrating as he watched his "brainchild" suffer and diminish
while he was powerless to combat decisions made by a s' bgroup of the
executive committee. His lawyers explained that it was not a function of
lawyers to arrange management employment contracts, and, while sym-
pathetic with the condition of their client, they apparently felt no respon-
sibility for that condition. Their concern might well have been for their
liability if the standard of the informed consent of a reasonably prudent
client were used in judging the quality of the legal services provided.
58. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Rockhill
v. Pollard, 259 Ore. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88
Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291
(1975).
59. See, e.g., Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, 89 Wash. 2d 959, 577 P.2d
580 (1978); see also cases cited supra note 57.
60. H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFFEW, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING: INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 333 (1972).
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Family law (specifically marriage dissolutions) is an area in which
clients probably undergo much treatment by lawyers to which they have
not given informed consent. 6' For the most part clients coming to lawyers
concerning a marriage dissolution are troubled, inexperienced, and un-
sophisticated. A battered wife will certainly need more than legal services
and protection, and she will have been inadequately served if that is all
she receives. Many persons undergoing "friendly" marriage dissolutions
have no understanding that the dissolution will substitute a new set of
problems for the existing set of problems without returning them to the
state of freedom and enjoyment they had before marriage. Two persons
do not live together as cheaply as one, but it certainly is not possible
to maintain two households at the same economic level of enjoyment as
one-a fact obvious to a lawyer with experience, but unconsidered by
at least some clients. Income tax consequences of alimony as contrasted
with a property settlement and child custody awards deserve discussion.
The possibility of harassing interferences with visitation rights deserves
consideration in framing a visitation program, and the client is probably
much better qualified to pass upon the harassing tendencies of the oppos-
ing spouse.62 A lawyer who immediately undertakes to bring about a
dissolution of a marriage without investigation of these and related ques-
tions and without exploration of the possibility of reconciliation has almost
certainly propelled a client into a course of conduct without informed
consent. Again, Professor Freeman has provided us with an archetypal
example in his case history of "The Rabbi and the Horsewhip Lawyer." ' 63
Damages may be difficult to prove, but once a requirement of informed
consent has been established the standards for determining damages are
likely to be developed in ensuing litigation.
Most criminal prosecutions terminate in a plea bargained result.6" This
almost certainly means that most defendants in those cases have entered
a plea on the advice of counsel that it was the preferred course to follow.
Counsel who specialize in criminal law practice have an obvious self-interest
in establishing themselves with prosecutors and judges as reliable predic-
tors of the future behavior of clients-an interest which may not coincide
with a client's desire to minimize the duration of an experience designed
to deter future criminal conduct. 6' This conflict is probably not discussed
61. See Mussehl, Washington Dissolution Practice: Meeting Divorce Clients' Needs,
33 WASH. ST. B. NEWS No. 10, at 11 (1979).
62. See C. PECK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEGOTIATION 166 (2d ed. 1980).
63. H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFFEN, supra note 60, at 183. Other cases of inadequate
counselling are set out in the pages following. See especially "Bovine and the Buxom Nurse."
Id. at 203.
64. See generally H. MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE
UNITED STATES (1978).
65. See H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 60, 253-55 (containing the history
of a case in which defense counsel advised a judge to "scare hell out of" his client, and
then arranged for a suspended sentence, all without consulting the client).
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with clients, and it is probably not immediately obvious to clients, which
makes open and full discussion of the risks of alternative defense strategies
and tactics of even greater importance. Is the certainty of a sentence
following a guilty plea to a misdemeanor to be preferred to the risk of
conviction of a felony in a trial? What are the prospects in a trial before
a judge-before a jury? What are the prospects of affecting the sentenc-
ing process after conviction and what should be done to develop a
favorable pre-sentencing report to the sentencing judge? Can a favorable
pre-sentencing report be developed without full and informed participa-
tion of the defendant? Again, damages may be difficult to prove, but
once a requirement of informed consent has been established the stand-
ards for determining damages are likely to be developed in the ensuing
litigation."
Other situations involving potential liability for lack of informed con-
sent can be suggested. For example, how often do counsel selected by
an insurance company to represent an insured make full disclosure of the
potential conflict of interest between the insured and the insurer and alert
the insured to the events which could give rise to such a conflict? Should
a physician be permitted to agree to a settlement favored by his insurer
because he believes his practice is likely to suffer if a malpractice case
goes to trial? 7 If no law requires a non-union employer to observe seniority
in determining the order of layoff, should the client be alerted to the
possibility that personnel problems will be created if that order of layoff
appears to be governed by arbitrary considerations? Further, should the
client be advised those problems may provide a basis for a successful union
organizing campaign? Should an established artist who believes a major
work has been copied by a younger artist be counselled that imitation
is the highest form of flattery rather than receive only the appraisal of
the possibilities of success in a suit for infringement of copyright which
creates a reputation for jealous harassment of younger artists? Should
matters of public relations and institutional reputation play as great a
role as the law in a charitable institution's determination of whether or
not to resist a challenge to the validity of a will making a substantial
gift to the charity?68 I am sure that lawyers familiar with specialized areas
of law and particular businesses or activities could greatly lengthen the
list of situations in which adequate counselling requires more than a discus-
sion of only legal principles.
If the legal profession is subjected to the same standards for informed
66. For a discussion of the problems of proving damages for legal malpractice in criminal
proceedings, see New Developments, supra note 9, at 447-50.
67. A study of the effects of malpractice suits on the practices of 58 Connecticut physi-
cians indicated that the effects were insignificant. Wycoff, The Effects of a Malpractice
Suit upon Physicians in Connecticut, in 2 TORTS AND MEDICAL YEARBOOK 862 (A. Auer-
bach & D. Belli eds. 1962).
68. See, e.g., C. PECK, supra note 62, at 25.
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consent as the medical profession, there will be a loss of "efficiency"
in the sense that lawyers will have to spend time with clients, discussing
matters which are not technical legal subjects. Indeed, they will have to
spend more time discussing and explaining technical legal matters with
clients than they do at present. Given the complaints that legal services
are already too expensive, 69 is the predictable recognition of an informed
consent standard to be lamented?
Of course, the costs of medical care have likewise risen rapidly in
recent years. It has been suggested with some frequency that the increased
costs are due in substantial part to adoption of defensive medical
procedures-procedures followed to forestall law suits rather than for the
benefit of the patient. The time of physicians is very valuable, and time
spent informing a patient of the risks of a proposed procedure, risks of
alternative procedures, and the possible benefits of additional diagnostic
tests certainly adds to the cost of medical services. Physicians complain
that the information required is not understood by patients 0 and that
upon occasion it creates unnecessary anxiety, or induces a patient to refuse
a required treatment.71 Indeed, it is understandable that physicians com-
plain that the standards imposed upon them by the legal profession and
the judiciary require them to give a patient the equivalent of a short course
through medical school before treating that patient. As mentioned above,
the judicial response has been that appropriate respect for human dignity
and an individual's right to control what happens to his body justifies
the expense. A similar response might suffice to answer the complaint
that the costs of legal services will be raised.
The experience in the field of medicine suggests, however, that pa-
tients are delighted to receive the information, that they seldom refuse
to undergo diagnostic procedures, and that they likewise are not deterred
from undergoing dangerous surgery." A patient's understanding of the
dangers of a diagnostic test or medical procedure may even reduce the
frequency of malpractice suits for undesirable results, and hence the cost
of medical care.73 Comparable favorable results are expectable for the
legal profession. A carefully performed study of personal injury claims
in the First Department of the New York courts indicated that actively
participating clients received better settlements of their personal injury
claims than did clients who conformed to the traditional passive role of
the uninformed and inactive client (their lawyers also received higher con-
69. See, e.g., Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, HARv. MAG., May-
June 1983, at 38-45, 70-71, reprinted in 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 574 (1983).
70. See Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1579, 1581 (1976).
71. See DeLee, Malpractice and Informed Consent-A Legal Ploy, 61 INT'L SURGEON
331, 332 (1976).
72. See Martyn, supra note 14, at 341-42.
73. Id. at 342-43.
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tingent fees).7 4 A Gallup poll of 1025 Canadian adults indicated that fifty
percent of them most desired a lawyer who would explain the details of
a case. 5 A major complaint about the quality of legal services is that
lawyers have failed to give clients an adequate explanation of the status
of their case or problem and actions which the lawyer has taken and will
take.7" Recognition of a requirement that lawyers obtain informed con-
sent of clients to pursuit of a course of action will not only eliminate
the complaints; it will improve the quality of the actual service. The ser-
vice will also be better received and more appreciated because it is
understood. Recognizing a duty of lawyers to obtain the informed con-
sent of their clients will serve human dignity by permitting clients to exer-
cise greater control over very important aspects of their lives."
The bud of a new tort here offered is no more than a bud. I believe
it will bloom. The result will be an improvement in the quality of service
provided society by the legal profession and a consequent and earned
enhancement of the standing of the profession.
74. See D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 43, at 29-61 (particularly pages 57 and 61).
75. See Martyn, supra note 14, at 308 n.4.
76. In 1978 the American Bar Foundation study on the legal needs of the public found
that 5007o or more of the surveyed respondents agreed with the statement that lawyers are
generally not good at keeping the clients informed of progress on their case and 30070 or
more agreed with the statement that lawyers do not care whether their clients understand
what needs to be done and why. Link, Improving the Quality of Lawyers' Services to Clients,
65 A.B.A. J. 387, at IA (1979).
77. See Martyn, supra note 14, at 340-43, 352-53.
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